Integrated access authorization

ABSTRACT

A facility for performing an access control check as an integral component of an operating system and utilizing a centralized policy store is provided. The facility executes as an integral part of an operating system executing on a computer and receives an authorization query to determine whether a principal has authorization to access a resource. The facility applies a policy maintained in a centralized policy store that is applicable to the principal to determine whether authorization exists to access the resource. If authorization does not exist, the facility denies the authorization query and records an indication of the denial of the authorization in an audit log. The facility may trigger events based on the auditing of authorization queries. The facility may also record an indication of authorization to access the resource in the audit log. The facility may additionally determine whether the authorization query is a request for authorization to perform an inherently dangerous operation, and record an indication of an authorization to perform the inherently dangerous operation in the audit log.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

This application is a continuation application of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 10/957,509, filed on Oct. 1, 2004, and entitled“INTEGRATED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION,” which is incorporated herein in itsentirety by reference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The described technology is directed to computer security and, moreparticularly, to controlling access to resources on a computer system.

BACKGROUND

As dependence on computers and computer networks increases along withthe sophistication and the frequency of attacks on computers andcomputer networks, the subject of computer security is becoming evermore prominent in the industry. Current computer security techniques areinadequate in protecting application programs and operating systems frommalicious software (“malware”)—e.g., viruses, worms, andtrojans—designed specifically damage or disrupt a computer system, andother undesirable activity.

Existing access control security models typically rely on a user'scredentials to authorize access to resources on a computer. In thesemodels, every process that runs or executes with the same credentials isgiven the same access rights, whether or not the process needs access toall the resources that is available to the user. Also, a process thatneeds access to a resource, e.g., to read, write, etc., specifies therequired access at the time the resource is accessed.

For example, a user logs on to a personal computer with a user account,and expects to be able to access all word processing documents stored onthe personal computer and created using a particular word processingprogram. In order to satisfy this expectation, a conventional accesscontrol security system grants all programs running in the users contextpermission to access to all of the aforementioned word processingdocuments. This is a grant of an excess level of permission, however,because few programs running in the user context other than the wordprocessing program actually need to access to any of the word processingdocuments.

Typically, malware infects processes by exploiting code defects. Oncemalware runs inside of a compromised process, it inherits the accessrights of the user context in which the process is running, and getsaccess to all resources that are available to the user, which might befar greater than what the original process ever needed.

Accordingly, an integrated approach to access authorization thatimproves and enhances the security of resources on a computer will havesignificant utility.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating selected components typicallyincorporated in at least some of the computer systems on which thefacility executes.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating selected components of thefacility, according to some embodiments.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example policy suitable for use by the facility,according to some embodiments.

FIG. 4 illustrates a flow chart of a method by which the facilityperforms auditing of denied access requests, according to someembodiments.

FIG. 5 illustrates a flow chart of a method by which the facilityperforms auditing of inherently dangerous operations, according to someembodiments.

FIG. 6 illustrates a flow chart of a method by which the facilityperforms learning to facilitate fine-tuning of a policy, according tosome embodiments.

FIG. 7 illustrates a flow chart of a method by which the facilityprovides a tiered access control check, according to some embodiments.

FIG. 8 illustrates a flow chart of a method by which the facilitydetermines a level of security risk of an application program, accordingto some embodiments.

FIG. 9 illustrates a flow chart of a method by which the facilityimposes a more restrictive policy upon detecting an anomaly, accordingto one embodiment.

FIG. 10 illustrates a flow chart of a method by which the facilityimposes a policy upon detecting an anomaly, according to someembodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

A software facility (“facility”) for protecting a computer system fromthe adverse effects arising from exploits against application andoperating system programs on the computer system is described. In someembodiments, the facility is implemented as an integral part of theoperating system and adds a logic-driven access control layer to theoperating system. For example, the facility is implemented in a mannerthat is integral to the operating system access control mechanism.

The facility may provide an authorization module that receivesauthorization queries for various security-sensitive resource accessesand returns a decision to allow or deny a resource access based on acentralized policy. A policy is a set of rules and practices thatdetermine how a resource—such as, by way of example, a network, a filesystem, an application program, etc.—is managed and protected. In acentralized policy store, the rules in a policy are centrally located,which allows the rules and/or the policy to be revoked centrally and setcentrally. This is in contrast to a distributed or per-object accesscontrol model, typically implemented using access control lists that arebound to physical objects.

The authorization module may be queried directly by the variousoperating system components that service resource access requests issuedby user mode programs, e.g., application programs executing in a usercontext. Alternatively, the authorization module may be queried by an“interception layer” sitting on top of such operating system components.The interception layer is code that intercepts the system call functionsused by the user mode programs to access the resources, and applies“wrappers” to the intercepted system call functions. The authorizationmodule makes its access control decisions (i.e., allow or deny) based onan identity of a principal, which is either the identity of theapplication program—e.g., application process—attempting the resourceaccess, or a combination of the identity of the application program andthe identity of the user on whose behalf the application program isexecuting, and a policy that applies to the principal.

In some embodiments, the facility provides an auditing feature. Forexample, a policy may indicate that a particular action, whetherauthorization is either allowed (e.g., granted) or denied (e.g.,blocked), to be the subject of an audit so that an entry is added to anaudit log. The entry may include an indication of the failed rule, theresource or object, and the principal. For certain operations, such asinherently dangerous operations, the entry may include an indication ofthe rule, whether the rule was allowed or denied, the resource orobject, and the principal. The facility may additionally trigger eventsbased on the audit. For example, the facility may be configured toprovide the principal (e.g., the application program and/or the user) orother interested party a notification or indication of the failed ruleor the inherently dangerous operation.

In some embodiments, the facility provides a learning mode feature wherethe facility tests or reports on a rule instead of applying the rule.For example, a rule in a policy may specify that a request forauthorization to perform an action be denied. If learning mode isactivated for the rule, for example, by an author of the policy, thefacility, rather than denying the requested authorization to perform theaction, allows or grants the authorization to perform the action, andraises an event indicating that the request for authorization to performthe action would have been denied. The facility may generate a report,which indicates, for example, the rule that would have been blocked,state of the application program prior to requesting the action, and thelike. The learning mode feature facilitates fine-tuning of the policy.For example, an author of a policy can analyze the report and make adetermination of whether a policy or a rule in the policy needs to bemore or less restrictive.

In some embodiments, the facility is executed as part of a tiered accesscontrol check. Here, the facility performs it policy check as part of aseries of access control checks. For example, when a resource request ismade, the conventional access control mechanism may initially be invokedto determine whether there is authorization for the requested resource.Subsequent to the conventional access control mechanism initiallydetermining that there is authorization for the requested resource, thefacility may be invoked to check its policies to determine whether thereis authorization for the requested resource. Subsequently, one or morefurther access control checks may additionally be invoked to ultimatelydetermine whether there is authorization for the requested resource.

The various embodiments of the facility and its advantages are bestunderstood by referring to FIGS. 1-10 of the drawings. The elements ofthe drawings are not necessarily to scale, emphasis instead being placedupon clearly illustrating the principles of the invention. Throughoutthe drawings, like numerals are used for like and corresponding parts ofthe various drawings.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating selected components typicallyincorporated in at least some of the computer systems on which thefacility executes. These computer systems 100 may include one or morecentral processing units (“CPUs”) 102 for executing computer programs; acomputer memory 104 for storing programs and data—including datastructures—while they are being used; a persistent storage device 106,such as a hard drive, for persistently storing programs and data; acomputer-readable media drive 108, such as a CD-ROM drive, for readingprograms and data stored on a computer-readable medium; and a networkconnection 110 for connecting the computer system to other computersystems, such as via the Internet, to exchange programs and/ordata—including data structures.

The facility may be described in the general context ofcomputer-readable instructions, such as program modules, executed bycomputer systems 100 or other devices. Generally, program modulesinclude routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, etc.that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract datatypes. Memory 104 and persistent storage device 106 arecomputer-readable media that may contain instructions that implement thefacility. It will be appreciated that memory 104 and persistent storage106 may have various other contents in addition to the instructions thatimplement the facility.

It will be appreciated that computer systems 100 may include one or moredisplay devices for displaying program output, such as video monitors orLCD panels, and one or more input devices for receiving user input, suchas keyboards, microphones, or pointing devices such as a mouse. Whilecomputer systems 100 configured as described above are typically used tosupport the operation of the facility, it will be appreciated that thefacility may be implemented using devices of various types andconfigurations, and having various components.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating selected components of thefacility, according to some embodiments. As illustrated in FIG. 2, thefacility includes an authorization module 202 which is implemented as anintegral component of an operating system 204 suitable for executing oncomputer system 100. Authorization module 202 generally functions as anadded protection layer to high risk processes such as network facingapplications, network facing services and operating system components,applications dealing with untrusted content, and untrusted code, e.g.,typically, code delivered via the Internet. Authorization module 202provides the logic for performing the policy driven access control ofthe resources available on computer system 100.

The facility also includes policies 206 from which authorization module202 makes its access control decisions. Policies 206 are the rules thatdetermine whether to allow or deny a request for authorization to accessa resource. In some embodiments, policies 206 get compiled intoruntime—e.g., binary—rules that get enforced by operating system 204and, in particular, authorization module 202. In some embodiments,policies 206 are implemented as part of a centralized policy store,which allows policies 206, including the rules in the policies 206, tobe revoked centrally and set centrally, for example, by users and/oradministrators.

Authorization module 202 may be queried by the various operating systemkernel components 208 that service resource access requests issued by aprincipal, e.g., a principal 212 a. Authorization module 202 may also bequeried by an interception layer 210 that intercepts the system callfunctions issued by a principal, e.g., a principal 212 b, to access theresources. Interception layer 210 applies wrappers to the interceptedsystem call functions to enable authorization module 202 to perform theaccess control check against the applicable policy 206. For example,applying a wrapper may include determining the identity of the principaland/or various environmental factors associated with computing system100 and providing this information as part of a request forauthorization to perform a system call to authorization module 202 toenable it to perform the access control check. Moreover, authorizationmodule 202 may directly be queried by a principal, e.g., a principal 212c.

In some embodiments, the access control check performed by authorizationmodule 202 is a function of a principal making the resource accessrequest and a policy that applies to the principal. As such,authorization module 202 makes its access control decisions (i.e., allowor deny) based on an identity of a principal—either the identity of acalling application program, or the combination of the identity of thecalling application program and the identity of a user on whose behalfthe application program is executing—and the rules in the policy thatare applicable to the principal. In some embodiments, authorizationmodule 202 may additionally consider parameters, such as, by way ofexample, type of access requested, environmental factors—e.g., is thecomputer on which the application program is executing inside acorporate network or connected to a public network, patch level of thecomputer, etc.—in addition to the identity of the principal and therules in the policy that are applicable to the principal in making itsaccess control decision.

In some embodiments, the facility may include an optional anomalydetection module 214 as depicted by the broken or “dashed” lines in FIG.2. Anomaly detection module 214 generally functions to monitor thebehavior of computer system 100 and the programs executing on computersystem 100 in order to detect an anomalous state. In some embodiments,anomaly detection module 214 provides the facility a first notificationupon detecting an anomaly and a subsequent, second notification upondetecting the cessation of the previously detected anomaly. This enablesthe facility to activate the enforcement of policies 206 upon detectionof an anomaly, until the anomaly has ended, after which policies 206 areno longer enforced. Alternatively, the facility may initially impose aless restrictive set of policies until an anomaly is detected, in whichcase a more restrictive set of policies are enforced, until the anomalyhas ended and the less restrictive set of policies are again enforced.Anomaly detection module 214 may detect an anomaly in either a singleprocess executing on computer system 100, a group of processes executingon computer system 100, or the entire computer system 100.

The aforementioned aspects of the facility are only illustrative and arenot intended to suggest any limitation as to the implementation of theillustrated components and/or the scope of use or functionality of thefacility. For example, in some embodiments, authorization module 202need not be implemented as part of or integral to operating system 204,but may be implemented separate of or outside operating system 204, forexample, as a non-operating system program. Moreover, in someembodiments, policies 206 need not be implemented as or a part of acentralized policy store. Thus, policies 206 need not be in one place,but may be implemented using, for example, a distributed model.Furthermore, even though policies 206 are depicted as part of orcontained in authorization module 202, policies 206 need only beaccessible by authorization module 202.

In the discussion that follows, embodiments of facility are described inconjunction with a variety of illustrative examples. It will beappreciated that the embodiments of facility may be used incircumstances that diverge significantly from these examples in variousrespects.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example policy suitable for use by the facility,according to some embodiments. The example policy includes the rules toprotect a web server application. By way of example, an applicationprocess, as indicated by item 302, requesting a resource is checked todetermine if it is a WebServerX web server process, as indicated by item304. If authorization module 202 determines that the requestingapplication process is a WebServerX web server process, authorizationmodule 202 either allows or denies authorization for the requestedresource based on the rules included in the policy.

As illustrated, the example policy contains the privileges or accessrights granted to a WebServerX process, and the default is to denyauthorization for the requested resource, as indicated by rule 306,unless the privilege or access right is specified. Stated another way,unless the requested resource is explicitly granted in the policy,authorization for the requested resource is denied. In some embodiments,the policy may contain rules that specify access restrictions, e.g.,rules that specify that authorization to perform particular actions bedenied or that deny authorization to access resources, or rules thatcause an audit, e.g., log an event.

The first rule in the example policy is a directive to permit theWebServerX process to write “$html” files, as indicated by item 308, to“$WebDirectories,” as indicated by item 310. The “$html” is arepresentation of a collection of file types, for example, *.html,*.gif, etc. The “$WebDirectories” is a representation of a collection ofdirectories configured to be web directories, and may be defined by anadministrator, such as a web administrator, who is different than thecreator of the policy, such as a security administrator. For example,authorization module 202 returns an allow decision (i.e., grant ofauthorization) based on this rule in response to a WebServerX processrequesting to write a file of a type defined by the parameter “$html” toone of the directories defined by the parameter “$WebDirectories.” Thus,a rule in the policy may apply to dynamic, independently defined groupsof objects, such as “$WebDirectories,” and dynamically configurableenvironment parameters, such as “$html.”

The second rule in the example policy is a directive to permit theWebServerX process to write to the “$FTP Upload Directory,” as indicatedby item 312, if it is executing on behalf of “user A,” as indicated byitem 314. For example, authorization module 202 returns an allowdecision (i.e., grant of authorization) based on this rule in responseto a WebServerX process executing on behalf of user A requesting towrite to the “$FTP Upload Directory.”

The third rule in the example policy is a directive to permit inboundhttp traffic, as indicated by item 316. For example, authorizationmodule 202 returns an allow decision (i.e., grant of authorization)based on this rule in response to a WebServerX process requesting toreceive inbound http data, e.g., receive http data packets transmittedover a network connection.

The fourth rule in the example policy is a directive to permit “FTPtraffic,” as indicated by item 318, if the variable “$FTP” is enabled,as indicated by item 320. Here, “$FTP” is a variable, and may be set byan administrator who is different than a security administrator whocreated the policy. For example, authorization module 202 performs arun-time check to determine if the variable “$FTP” is enabled, and ifso, returns an allow decision (i.e., grant of authorization) based onthis rule in response to a WebServerX process requesting to send orreceive data defined by the parameter “FTP traffic.” Alternatively, ifthe “$FTP” is not enabled, authorization module 202 will return a denydecision (i.e., denial of authorization) in response to theaforementioned access request as indicated by item 306.

It will be appreciated that the policy may include rules that defineprivileges for objects within and outside the operating system, such asapplication processes as illustrated by the example privilege above. Therules in a policy may be specified using a rich schema, similar towriting code using compiled or interpreted programming language. Forexample, the schema may support the inclusion of conditions and temporalconditions, e.g., “allow X only if Y,” dependencies on dynamicallyconfigurable environment parameters and variables, dependencies onenvironmental factors, and the like, in the rules. Moreover, the use ofparameters facilitates the creation of rules that apply to both presentand future objects. For example, documents of a particular type may berepresented by a parameter, and using the parameter, a rule can becreated that specifies a restriction that applies to all documents ofthat particular type, whether currently in existence or later created.In some embodiments, the policy may specify that certain decisions areto be relegated to the end user for decision, for example, through apop-up dialog box.

FIG. 4 illustrates a flow chart of a method 400 by which the facilityperforms auditing of denied access requests, according to someembodiments. By way of example, a user (e.g., UserABC) may have loggedon to a computer and started a word processing application (e.g., WPApp)and requested to open a file (e.g., FileX) stored in a directory (e.g.,YZDir) on the computer. As a result, WPApp issues a request to accessthe resource FileX stored in directory YZDir. Beginning at a start step,authorization module 202 receives the authorization query, e.g., arequest for authorization to access FileX stored in YZDir, at step 402.

At step 404, authorization module 202 identifies the principal that isrequesting the authorization to access FileX stored in YZDir. In theabove example, the principal may either be WPApp or the combination ofWPApp and UserABC. At step 406, authorization module 202 identifies thepolicy applicable to the identified principal, for example, from acentralized policy store such as policies 206, and performs an accesscontrol check based on the identity of the principal and the applicablepolicy. At step 408, authorization module 202 determines whether theresult of the access control check performed in step 406 is to denyaccess. Continuing the above example, authorization module 202 analyzesthe identified applicable policy to determine whether a rule orprivilege in the policy authorizes the principal to access FileX storedin YZDir, at step 408.

If authorization module 202 determines that the applicable policyauthorizes the principal to perform the requested action, then at step420, authorization module 202 returns an allow decision, which is anindication that the principal is authorized to perform the requestedaction, and proceeds to an end step. Alternatively, if authorizationmodule 202 determines that the applicable policy does not authorize theprincipal to perform the requested action, then at step 410,authorization module 202 returns a deny decision, which is an indicationthat the principal is not authorized to perform the requested action. Atstep 412, authorization module 202 may return an error string to theprincipal, informing the principal of the lack of authorization toperform the requested action.

At step 414, authorization module 202 checks to determine whetherauditing is enabled. A flag or a record associated with the applicablepolicy or rule may indicate whether to perform auditing. If auditing isnot enabled, authorization module 202 proceeds to an end step.Alternatively, if auditing is enabled, authorization module 202 makes anentry in an audit log at step 416. The entry may identify the deniedrequest, the failed rule, the principal, and/or the requested resource.

At step 418, authorization module 202 may trigger one or more eventsbased on the auditing of the denied request. For example, authorizationmodule 202 may provide a security administrator an indication, e.g., viaemail, voice mail, text messaging, etc., of the attempt by the principalto perform an unauthorized action, terminate the application processsubsequent to the attempt by the principal to perform an unauthorizedaction, impose a stricter set of policies subsequent to the attempt bythe principal to perform an unauthorized action, and the like.Subsequent to triggering the events, authorization module 202 proceedsto an end step.

Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that, for this andother processes and methods disclosed herein, the functions performed inthe processes and methods may be implemented in differing order.Furthermore, the outlined steps are only exemplary, and some of thesteps may be optional, combined with fewer steps, or expanded intoadditional steps without detracting from the essence of the invention.

FIG. 5 illustrates a flow chart of a method 500 by which the facilityperforms auditing of inherently dangerous operations, according to someembodiments. By way of example, a user (e.g., UserABC) may have loggedon to a computer and started a web browser program (e.g., WebBrowser)and requested to access a web page (e.g., PageX) on an untrusted website (e.g., WebSiteY). As a result, WebBrowser issues a request toretrieve PageX from WebSiteY. Steps 502-508 are substantially similar tosteps 402-408 of method 400.

If, at step 508, authorization module 202 determines that the applicablepolicy does not authorize the principal to perform the requested action,then at step 510, authorization module 202 returns a deny decision,which is an indication that the principal is not authorized to performthe requested action. In the above example, WebBrowser may not haveauthorization to access untrusted site WebSiteY. At step 512,authorization module 202 may return an error string to the principal,informing the principal of the lack of authorization to perform therequested action. Subsequent to returning an error string, authorizationmodule proceeds to an end step.

Alternatively, if authorization module 202 determines that theapplicable policy authorizes the principal to perform the requestedaction, then at step 514, authorization module 202 returns an allowdecision, which is an indication that the principal is authorized toperform the requested action. At step 516, authorization module 202checks to determine whether the authorized action is an inherentlydangerous operation. For example, the facility may maintain a list ofinherently dangerous operations, and authorization module 202 may checkthis list to determine if the authorized action is listed as aninherently dangerous operation.

If the authorized action is found to be an inherently dangerousoperation, then at step 518, authorization module 202 performs an auditoperation. For example, authorization module 202 may make an entry in aninherently dangerous operation audit log of an indication of the requestand authorization to perform the inherently dangerous operation. Theentry may also include an indication of the principal that requested theauthorization to perform the inherently dangerous operation.Authorization module 202 may additionally perform other actions whichmay be triggered by the authorization to perform the inherentlydangerous operation. Subsequent to performing the audit operation atstep 518, or determining that the authorized action is not an inherentlydangerous operation at step 516, authorization module 202 proceeds to anend step.

In some embodiments, authorization module 202 may make an entry in theinherently dangerous operation audit log of an indication of a requestof authorization to perform an inherently dangerous operation.Continuing the above example, assuming that accessing untrusted siteWebSiteY is indicated to be an inherently dangerous operation and,further, the applicable policy does not grant WebBrowser authorizationto access WebSiteY, authorization module 202 returns a deny decision(step 510) and records the request for authorization to perform theinherently dangerous operation and the subsequent denial ofauthorization, for example, in the inherently dangerous operation auditlog. Authorization module 202 may also record an indication of theprincipal that requested authorization to perform the inherentlydangerous activity.

FIG. 6 illustrates a flow chart of a method 600 by which the facilityperforms learning to facilitate fine-tuning of a policy, according tosome embodiments. By way of example, a user (e.g., UserABC) may havelogged on to a computer and started a web browser program (e.g.,WebBrowser) and requested to access a web page (e.g., PageX) on a website (e.g., WebSiteY). As a result, WebBrowser issues a request toretrieve PageX from WebSiteY. Steps 602-608 are substantially similar tosteps 402-408 of method 400.

If, at step 608, authorization module 202 determines that the applicablepolicy authorizes the principal to perform the requested action, then atstep 610, authorization module 202 returns an allow decision, which isan indication that the principal is authorized to perform the requestedaction, and proceeds to an end step. Alternatively, if authorizationmodule 202 determines that the applicable policy does not authorize theprincipal to perform the requested action, then at step 612,authorization module 202 checks to determine whether learning is enabledfor the rule in the policy that denies authorization to perform therequested action. Continuing the above example, a policy applicable toWebBrowser may contain a rule that expressly denies WebBrowser access tothe Internet and, thus, WebSiteY, but, may also provide an indication toapply learning instead of applying the rule.

If authorization module 202 determines that learning is not enabled forthe rule that denies authorization to perform the requested action, thenat step 618, authorization module 202 returns a deny decision, which isan indication that the principal is not authorized to perform therequested action. In the above example, the rule that expressly deniesWebBrowser access to the Internet and, thus, WebSiteY, may not have anindication to apply learning. In this instance, the rule is applied andWebBrowser is denied authorization to access WebSiteY. At step 620,authorization module 202 may return an error string to the principal,informing the principal of the lack of authorization to perform therequested action. Subsequent to returning an error string, authorizationmodule proceeds to an end step.

Alternatively, if, at step 612, authorization module 202 determines thatlearning is enabled for the rule that denies authorization to performthe requested action, then at step 614, authorization module 202 makesan entry in a learning report log of an indication of the failed rule.The entry may also include an indication of the principal that requestedthe authorization to perform the action that resulted in the failedrule. At step 616, authorization module 202 returns an allow decision,which is an indication that the principal is authorized to perform therequested action, and proceeds to an end step. Thus, instead of applyingthe applicable rule, authorization module 202 grants authorization toperform the requested action and records an indication of this event. Asecurity administrator or other interested user can then analyze thecontents of the learning report log to determine whether a rule orpolicy is too restrictive or not restrictive enough, and fine-tune therule or policy before actually enforcing or implementing the rule orpolicy.

In some embodiments, authorization module 202 may make an entry in thelearning report log of an indication of a rule that provided theauthorization to perform a requested action. Continuing the aboveexample, assuming that a rule expressly authorizes WebBrowser access tothe Internet and, thus, WebSiteY, and also provides an indication toapply learning, authorization module 202 returns an allow decision (step610) and records an indication of the rule that provided theauthorization to perform the requested action. This information may alsobe used to fine-tune the rule or policy. For example, if it isdetermined from the entries in the report log that authorization toaccess a resource was too readily granted, the rule or policy may beadjusted or altered to reduce the instances where authorization toaccess to the resource is granted.

FIG. 7 illustrates a flow chart of a method 700 by which the facilityprovides a tiered access control check, according to some embodiments.Referring again to one of the prior examples, a user (e.g., UserABC) mayhave logged on to a computer and started a word processing application(e.g., WPApp) and requested to open a file (e.g., FileX) stored in adirectory (e.g., YZDir) on the computer. As a result, WPApp issues arequest to access the resource FileX stored in directory YZDir.Beginning at a start step, authorization module 202 receives theauthorization query, e.g., a request for authorization to access FileXstored in YZDir, at step 702.

At step 704, an operating system running on the user's computer performsa conventional access control check. Continuing the above example, theoperating system may check to determine whether the user has rights toopen (e.g., read access) FileX in YZDir. At step 706, the operatingsystem, using its conventional access check mechanism, determineswhether to deny the user access to FileX.

If the operating system's conventional access check mechanism determinesthat the user should be denied access to FileX, then at step 708, theoperating system returns a deny decision, and proceeds to an end step.The deny decision is an indication that the user is not authorized toperform the requested action, e.g., open FileX. Alternatively, if theoperating system's conventional access check mechanism determines thatthe user should not be denied access to FileX, then at step 710,authorization module 202 identifies the principal that is requesting theauthorization to access FileX stored in YZDir.

At step 712, authorization module 202 identifies the policy applicableto the identified principal, for example, from a centralized policystore such as policies 206, and performs an access control check basedon the identity of the principal and the applicable policy. Continuingthe above example, authorization module 202 analyzes the identifiedapplicable policy to determine whether a rule or privilege in the policyauthorizes the principal to access FileX stored in YZDir, at step 714.

If authorization module 202 determines that the applicable policyauthorizes the principal to perform the requested action, then at step720, authorization module 202 returns an allow decision, which is anindication that the principal is authorized to perform the requestedaction, and proceeds to an end step. Alternatively, if authorizationmodule 202 determines that the applicable policy does not authorize theprincipal to perform the requested action, then at step 716,authorization module 202 returns a deny decision, which is an indicationthat the principal is not authorized to perform the requested action. Atstep 718, authorization module 202 may return an error string to theprincipal, and proceeds to an end step. The error string may inform theprincipal of the lack of authorization to perform the requested action.

It will be appreciated that the tiered access check may be performed inthe reverse order from that illustrated by method 700. For example,authorization module 202 first performs its access control check. Ifauthorization module 202 determines that authorization should be givenfor a particular resource access, then the operating system performs itssecurity check using its conventional access control mechanism.

FIG. 8 illustrates a flow chart of a method 800 by which the facilitydetermines a level of security risk of an application program, accordingto some embodiments. In particular, the facility makes an assessment ofthe level of security risk and/or intent of an application program basedupon an analysis of a policy designated for the application program. Byway of example, a user may have logged on to a computer and requested toload and/or execute an application program on the computer.

Beginning at a start step, an operating system running on the userscomputer receives a request to load/execute the application program atstep 802. At step 804, the operating system invokes the facility todetermine whether the application program has a corresponding policy.For example, the policy applicable to the application program may bemaintained as part of policies 206. If the facility determines that apolicy applicable to the application program does not exist, thefacility informs the operating system that an applicable policy does notexist. At step 806, the operating system denies the request toload/execute the application program and returns an error condition.Subsequent to denying the request, the operating system proceeds to anend step for this request.

Alternatively, if, at step 804, the facility determines that a policyapplicable to the application program does exist, then at step 808, thefacility analyzes the applicable policy to determine the level ofpotential security risk associated with or resulting fromloading/executing the application program. The facility may base thelevel of risk on the level or extent of authorization granted by therules in the policy. For example, if the rules authorize the applicationprogram to a lot of resources or a number of inherently dangerousresources, the facility may set the level of risk higher than if therules only authorize the application program to a few, relatively saferesources. The facility informs the operating system that an applicablepolicy does exist, and proceeds to an end step.

FIG. 9 illustrates a flow chart of a method 900 by which the facilityimposes a more restrictive policy upon detecting an anomaly, accordingto some embodiments. By way of example, the facility running on acomputer may have two policies, a PolicyA and a PolicyB, which areapplicable to an application program. Moreover, PolicyA may be lessrestrictive than PolicyB in that PolicyA grants authorization to agreater number of resources.

Beginning at a start step, the facility imposes the less restrictivePolicyA at step 902. At step 904, the facility may detect an anomalousstate in an instance of the application program executing on thecomputer. Continuing the above example, an instance of the applicationprogram may be executing on the computer, and the facility may bemonitoring the executing application program process. While monitoringthe application program process, the facility may detect an anomalouscondition or state in the process. For example, the facility may havepreviously generated a directed graph that represents the system callsnormally issued by the application program by tracking previousinstances of the application program that ran on the computer, anddetermined the presence of an anomalous state from a comparison of thesystem calls made by the current application program process and thedirected graph.

At step 906, the facility imposes the more restrictive PolicyB inresponse to detecting the anomalous state, and proceeds to an end step.In one embodiment, the facility imposes the more restrictive PolicyB onthe application program process in which the anomalous state wasdetected. Alternatively, the facility may impose the more restrictivePolicyB on the application program, e.g., all instances or processes ofthe application program. Moreover, depending on the detected anomaly,the application program, and/or the particular policy, the facility mayimpose a set of more restrictive policies on the entire computer, e.g.,more restrictive policies are applied to all processes executing on thecomputer.

FIG. 10 illustrates a flow chart of a method 1000 by which the facilityimposes a policy upon detecting an anomaly, according to someembodiments. By way of example, the facility running on a computer mayhave a policy, PolicyA, which is applicable to a web applicationprogram. Beginning at a start step, the facility does not impose thepolicy on the web application program at step 1002. Thus, PolicyA isdormant and not applied to the instances of the web application programexecuting on the computer. At step 1004, the facility may detect ananomalous state in an instance of the web application program executingon the computer.

Continuing the above example, an instance of the web application programmay be executing on the computer, and the facility may be monitoring theexecuting web application program process. While monitoring theapplication program process, the facility may detect an anomalouscondition or state in the process. For example, the facility may monitorthe network traffic generated or caused by the web application processand determine from the network traffic that an anomalous state ispresent in the web application process. At step 1006, the facilityimposes the dormant policy, PolicyA, on the web application program, forexample, on the web application program process in which the anomaly wasdetected, and proceeds to an end step. Alternatively, the facility mayimpose PolicyA on all instances or processes of the web applicationprogram. Thus, the dormant policy becomes active and applied to the webapplication program.

From the foregoing, it will be appreciated that specific embodiments ofthe invention have been described herein for purposes of illustration,but that various modifications may be made without deviating from thespirit and scope of the invention. Accordingly, the invention is notlimited except as by the appended claims.

1. A computer-readable storage medium whose contents cause a computer to: receive an authorization query regarding a request to access a first resource; identify a principal requesting to access the first resource; perform an access control check to determine whether to deny authorization to access the first resource, the access control check being based on the principal and a first policy applicable to the principal, wherein the first policy is maintained as part of a centralized policy store and the first policy comprises one or more rules; and responsive to determining to deny authorization to access the first resource, return a deny decision denying authorization to access the first resource; enter an entry into an audit log, the entry recording the denial of authorization; and responsive to receiving a subsequent authorization query regarding a request from the identified principal to access a second resource, determine whether the requested access to the second resource comprises an inherently dangerous operation; responsive to determining that the requested access to the second resource does not comprise an inherently dangerous operation, perform an access control check to determine whether to deny authorization to access the second resource, the access control check being based on the principal and the first policy applicable to the principal; and responsive to determining that the requested access to the second resource comprises an inherently dangerous operation, impose a second policy applicable to the principal, wherein the first policy and the second policy are different policies, and wherein the second policy is more restrictive than the first policy; and perform an access control check to determine whether to deny authorization to access the second resource, the access control check being based on the principal and the second policy applicable to the principal, wherein the computer instructions are executed as an integral component of an operating system suitable for executing on the computer; and wherein the computer-readable storage medium is not a signal.
 2. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein the entry identifies the denied request to access the resource.
 3. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein the entry identifies a rule in the first policy that caused the denial of authorization to access the resource.
 4. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein the entry identifies the principal.
 5. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein the entry identifies the requested resource.
 6. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein the event includes providing an indication of the denied request to an interested party.
 7. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1 further comprising contents that cause the computer to, responsive to determining to allow authorization to access the resource, return an allow decision granting authorization to access the resource, and enter an entry into the audit log, the entry recording the authorization to access the resource.
 8. A computer-readable storage medium whose contents cause a computer to: receive an authorization query regarding a request to perform an operation on a computer; identify a principal requesting to perform the operation; perform an access control check to determine whether to allow authorization to perform the operation, the access control check being based on the principal and a policy applicable to the principal, wherein the policy is maintained as part of a centralized policy store and the policy comprises one or more rules; responsive to determining to allow authorization to perform the operation, determine whether the requested operation is an inherently dangerous operation; and responsive to determining that the requested operation is an inherently dangerous operation, enter an entry into an audit log, the entry recording the authorization to perform an inherently dangerous operation, such that the computer instructions are executed as an integral component of an operating system suitable for executing on the computer; and wherein the computer-readable storage medium is not a signal.
 9. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 8 further comprising contents that cause the computer to trigger an event based on the entry in the audit log.
 10. A computer-readable storage medium whose contents cause a computer to: receive an authorization query regarding a request to access a resource on a computer; perform a first access control check to determine whether to allow or deny authorization to access the resource; responsive to determining to allow authorization to access the resource based on the first access control check: identify a principal requesting access to the resource; perform a second access control check to determine whether to allow or deny authorization to access the resource, the second access control check being based on the principal and a policy applicable to the principal, wherein the policy is maintained as part of a centralized policy store and the policy comprises one or more rules; responsive to determining to allow authorization to access the resource, return an allow decision granting authorization to access the resource; determine whether the requested access to the resource comprises an inherently dangerous operation; and responsive to determining that the requested access to the resource comprises an inherently dangerous operation, record an entry into an audit log, the entry comprising the granting of authorization for the inherently dangerous operation; and responsive to determining to deny authorization to access the resource, return a deny decision denying authorization to access the resource, such that the computer instructions for the second access control check are executed as an integral component of an operating system suitable for executing on the computer; and wherein the computer-readable storage medium is not a signal.
 11. A method in a computing system for auditing requests to access a resource, the method comprising: identifying a principal requesting to access a resource; performing an access control check to determine whether to deny or allows authorization to access the resource, the access control check being based on the principal and a policy applicable to the principal, wherein the policy is maintained as part of a centralized policy store and the policy comprises one or more rules; responsive to determining to deny authorization to access the resource, returning a deny decision denying authorization to access the resource, and entering an entry into an audit log, the entry recording the denial of authorization; and responsive to determining to allow authorization to access the resource, returning an allow decision granting authorization to access the resource; determining whether the requested access to the resource comprises an inherently dangerous operation; and responsive to determining that the requested access to the resource comprises an inherently dangerous operation, making an entry into the audit log, the entry recording the granting of authorization for the inherently dangerous operation, wherein the method is performed by an integral component of an operating system executing on the computing system.
 12. The method of claim 11 further comprising providing a notification of the denial of authorization to a system administrator.
 13. The method of claim 11 further comprising, responsive to determining to deny authorization to access the resource, invoking a second policy applicable to the principal, the second policy being applied to a subsequent request made by the principal.
 14. The method of claim 11 further comprising, responsive to determining to deny authorization to access the resource, terminating a process associated with the principal, the process being identified as having made the request to access the resource.
 15. The method of claim 11 further comprising providing a notification of the grant of authorization to perform the inherently dangerous operation to an entity other than the principal.
 16. The method of claim 11 further comprising applying a second policy to the principal, the second policy being stricter than the policy. 